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ABSTRACT 
This report sets forth the requirements for a Systems Safety Program 
for a total space launch vehicle system. It defines the elements of such a 
program necessary to assure maximum safety and establishes the requirements 
for the accomplishment of those elements. 
shall be applied through all phases of the space launch vehicle system develop- 
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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM X-53623 
THE SYSTEMS SAFETY PROGRAM FOR A TOTAL SPACE 
LAUNCH VEH I CLE GENERAL REQU I REMENTS 
SUMMARY 
This report sets forth the requirements for a Systems Safety Program 
for a total space launch vehicle system. It defines the elements of such a 
program necessary to assure maximum safety and establishes the requirements 
for the accomplis'hmeni or" i.hose elements. 
shall be applied through all phases of the space launch vehicle system develop- 
ment including system definition, design, manufacture handling, storage, 
transportation, test, checkout and operation. 
Tne principles described herein 
I NTRODU CT ION 
The Systems Safety Program for a space launch vehicle system is not 
intended as an inhibiting activity. It is, conversely, an enabling activity which 
employs sound scientific engineering and management practices to support 
all phases of the product development, resulting in the safest possible system 
for  accomplishment of the mission. The Systems Safety Program has as its 
objectives the provision of the greatest possible management visibility concern- 
ing total system safety, the provision of preventive and/or corrective actions 
that can be used to ensure astronaut safety and mission success, the assurance 
that safety considerations are made a basic part of the total space launch 
vehicle system. 
DEF IN IT IONS 
Safety - is the freedom from those conditions which can cause injury o r  
death to personnel and damage to, or  loss of, equipment, property, o r  the 
mission . 
System - A s  applied to this specification is defined as the total launch 
vehicle system including ground support equipment. 
Systems Safety - is a systems engineering oriented discipline which 
functions to provide the greatest possible freedom from the occurrence of 
abnormal, o r  out-of-sequence, events that could, by their occurrence, cause 
the loss of the crew, the system, o r  the mission. 
THE SYSTEMS SAFETY PLAN (SSP) 
Each prime contractor or  producer of a major system shall prepare a 
systems safety plan that is in consonance with the phase of development of his 
respective system. This plan shall include an identification of the applicable 
major system safety program elements described herein. It shall include a 
detailed description of the management and technical methods that will be used 
to accomplish these program elements and how they will function, together 
with a schedule for their completion, keyed to major program milestones. The 
SSP shall include but is not limited to the following: 
I. Introduction and Scope 
11. Objectives 
III. Management Techniques 
A. The Systems Safety Organizational Structure 
B. The reporting lines 
C. The responsibility and authority 
D. The contractor interfaces 
E. The functional relationships with other disciplines such as 
Reliability and Maintainability and with the manufacture and 
testing organizations 
F. Data management - retention, distribution and effective use 
G. Unique management methods and the advantages 
H. Subcontractor systems safety management 
I. Training and development of technical competence 
J. Resource applications 
K. Progress reporting 
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IV. Technical Methods 
A. Trade-off study participation 
B. Analysis Techniques 
C . Criteria development 
D. Support of design reviews 
E. Procedures review, including manufacturing, handling, 
storage, transportation, checkout, test and operation 
F. Accident - Incident investigation support including planning 
G. Hardware change assessment 
H. Component failure analyses (UCR's) 
V. Schedules 
Showing accomplishment of safety program elements keyed to 
major program milestones or such schedule requirements as 
may be imposed by NASA to support systems safety integration. 
Approval of the SSP 
Each contractor's SSP shall be submitted to the NASA Center Technical 
Manager for Systems Safety for approval, and when approved shall constitute 
the contractor's systems safety work statement. All  changes to the SSP also 
shall require approval by the Technical Manager for Systems Safety. The 
approved plan shall be used by the procuring activity to measure the contractor 
performance in systems safety. 
Integrating SSP 
An SSP shall be prepared by the integrating contractor in the case of a 
system being developed by two o r  more prime contractors with a separate 
integration effort. This SSP shall describe the major integration program 
elements, the management and technical methods to be used and the schedule of 
completion. This SSP also requires approval by the NASA Center Technical 
Manager for systems safety. 
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Systems Safety Program Elements 
The Systems Safety Program Elements, listed in chronological order 
without regard for phase definition are as follows. 
I. Trade Studies for System Definition. The Contractor's Systems 
Safety organization shall participate in trade studies leading to system definition. 
Analyses shall be performed as required to ensure that hazards are not inad- 
vertently incorporated into the system during definition. 
2. Systems Safety Criteria Development. The Contractor's Systems 
Safety organization shall review data and experience gathered from all similar 
systems as a basis for safety criteria furnished in support of the design 
activities. 
3. Systems Safety Analysis. The contractor will  perform a system 
safety analysis of his system using the technique described in the appendix of 
this specification o r  equivalent. In the event that the contractor's product is 
one o r  more subsystems of a total system, he will  support the integration of 
his analysis into a total system safety analysis as performed by the integrating 
contractor in accordance with schedules established by the Center 's Technical 
Manager for Systems Safety. 
The analyses will be updated in accordance with established schedules to 
include each subsequent system in the series. 
Analysis applications. The contractor's systems safety organization 
will support all design and flight readiness reviews of the system as required 
by the NASA Center Technical Manager for systems safety using the completed 
safety analyses as a means of demonstrating the safety of the system. 
4. Procedures Review. The systems safety organization will  review 
all manufacturing, handling, transportation, storage, maintenance, testing, 
and operating procedures to ensure that they do not set up out-of-sequence 
events o r  otherwise create hazards to the system by their use. Criteria wil l  
be established as a basis for identifying test o r  operations that are hazardous. 
Those tests o r  operations that are hazardous will be given special attention 
including the development of back out o r  emergency planning and procedures. 
5. Activities During Manufacturing. The systems safety organization 
will coordinate wi th  manufacturing and with Quality Control at frequent intervals 
to provide system safety support to those efforts. 
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6. Hardware Charge Review. The systems safety organization will 
review and/or analyze all proposed changes to the system prior to incorporation 
to ensure that safety levels established for the system are not compromised by 
changes. 
7. Activities During Testing. The systems safety organization will 
provide close support to the test activities, including participation in the test 
program, to ensure that the safely of the system is considered in all decisions 
made during the performance of the tests. 
8. Analvsis of Failed Components. All  components failing during test 
o r  system checkout, as reported in the UCR system, will be analyzed to 
determine the potential impact of that failure on the safety of the operational 
system. 
Other Activities 
i. Technical Interchange. The contractor will support the interchange 
of system safety information, analyses and data with other contractors and the 
cognizant NASA Center through meetings and other means as set forth by the 
Technical Manager for Systems Safety. 
2. Accident-Incident Investimtioos. The systems safety organization 
will complete a plan for participation in accident-incident investigations. This 
plan will designate key personnel and describe their activities during the 
investigation. It will include provisions for the performance of diagnostic 
analyses as required to identify the causes of the event. 
3. Training. The contractor will provide his personnel with training 
both in the systems he is developing and in the systems safety discipline such 
that he develops a high level of skill and technical compentence. 
Relationships With Industrial Safety 
The contractor will review his system safety organizations activities 
and responsibilities at  frequent intervals in conjunction with the industrial 
safety activities to ensure that there are no voids in the interface between the 
two organizations and that the full spectrum of safety is receiving the proper 
effort. 
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Systems Safety Plan Approval 
I. Contractor Submittal. The contractor's system safety plan will be 
submitted to the Center's Technical Manager for Systems Safety (one original 
and six copies) five weeks following implementation of this specification. 
2. Plan Approval. The Center's Technical Manager for Systems 
Safety will review this plan and return it to the contractor within three weeks as 
approved o r  approved subject to required revisions o r  disapproved subject to 
required revisions. 
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APPENDIX 
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
The systems safety analysis, when completed, must be a useful tool 
and must be fully program effective. The technique employed should have 
sufficient versatility to encompass the complete system. It should provide 
management visibility as to the safety of the system in terms of a quantification 
of the safety; and it should identify critical fault paths, treating cascading 
faults, and interfunctional relationships. The analysis should be sufficiently 
flexible to measure the impact of both large and small system changes. 
Development of fault tree analysis techniques began in 1962 a t  Bell 
Telephone Laboratories ( BTL) . BTL performed a ballistic missile system 
safety study using a method of mathematical analysis applicable to probability 
combinations in a fault tree format. 
This technique is now expanding throughout the aerospace industry be- 
cause it possesses many unique capabilities: 
a - It allows the quantitative measurement of the safety of any given 
system. 
b - It can be used to assess the safety impact of any change to that 
system. 
c - It can locate and identify all of the critical paths and the possible 
failures which yield a given set of failure symptoms. 
d - It can accommodate Interfunctional Relationships and cascading 
faults. 
The following steps are required in fault tree analysis: 
I - Define the undesired event. 
2 - Acquire understanding of the system. 
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3 - Construct the fault tree. 
4 - Collect quantitative data. 
5 - Symbolize the fault tree algebraically. 
6 - Solve the algebraic equations to determine the level of safety. 
Step 1 - Define The Undesired Event 
The objective of a fault tree analysis is to identify all hazardous 
potentials (failures, malfunctions, o r  human errors)  within a system, 
determine the level of safety of the system, and indicate those areas where 
additional effort would be most fruitful in improving the safety level. 
The measurement of the level of safety for an operational product, 
requires initially the definition of the most undesired event, i. e. , the event 
which must be kept from happening. 
Definition of the most undesired event is not always as simple a s  it 
might appear from a superficial view of the system. The undesired event may 
not be the final result of a malfunction o r  incorrect procedure, but rather the 
final single action that inevitably leads to catastrophe. Consider the rotary 
lawn mower for example. The possibility of injury to the operator might appear 
to be the most undesired event to a lawnmower manufacturer. On the other 
hand, because of possible lawsuits, he should also be concerned with the possi- 
bility of his product throwing a blade o r  some other object and injuring a 
passerby. 
It is impossible to construct a fault tree with more than one "most 
undesired event"; yet it is possible to isolate several events that must be 
prevented from occurring. This situation makes it mandatory to establish 
terminology for the event that will  encompass the lesser events individually 
o r  collectively. 
A s  will be shown, fault tree analysis is a team effort. A tremendous 
amount of "brainstorming" and carefully considered inputs from many sources 
are required to make the analysis truly valid. 
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Step 2 - Acquire Understanding of the  System 
The safety of any system must be measured from a specific time 
interval and type of activity. For this reason, the systems safety analyst must 
thoroughly understand the system and its intended use. 
The calculation of exposure to operational environments requires the 
systems analyst to consider two variables: duration of operation and the stress 
levels. The length of projected missions will  have a direct bearing on exposure 
to known hazards and, therefore, may be assigned a specific numerical value in 
fault tree construction. The stress level will  vary with each segment of the 
mission, i. e. , countdown liftoff, boost, orbit, etc. 
The construction of a fault tree for a given system o r  operational 
procedure necessitates that the analyst consider controlled premature termina- 
tion of a specific event. For instance, an engine malfunction o r  failure may be 
compensated for by immediate abort action, still, the possibility of failure to 
react o r  incorrect reaction on the part of the astronaut must be considered. 
Conversely, a reasonable probability must be assigned for occurrence of the 
proper action. 
The analyst must also consider the possibility of inability to initiate 
controlled termination during certain segments of the analysis. Once the Lunar 
Module has returned from the lunar surface, for example, the Apollo system is 
committed to follow its normal mission profile and any inflight failures must be 
accepted as additional events in fault tree construction. 
The principal objective of the system safety analyst is to determine how 
the system, considering the crew as an integral part, could fail and cause the 
undesired event. The myriad details the engineer can develop to determine all 
the probable ways a system can fail depends on his understanding of the system. 
A space vehicle has so many subsystems it is obvious that the systems safety 
analyst cannot possibly have a thorough working knowledge of each. Thus, in 
addition to his basic skill he must have broad experience with subsystems in 
general and must understand the basic concepts of the various system functions 
involved. Accordingly, a complete Fault Tree analysis can be developed 
cooperatively only by a group of engineers having all of these required skills. 
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Step 3 - Construct The Fault Tree 
A fault tree is a graphical representation of the sequential relation- 
ships of basic system fault events which can contribute to the occurrence of the 
end fault condition defined by the tree. 
The development of a particular fault tree is accomplished in an order- 
ly manner and begins with definition of the end system fault condition o r  unde- 
sired event for which a determination of probability of occurrence must be 
made. Once definition of the end fault event is made, the system is analyzed 
and all possible sequences of events are determined which, upon occurrence, 
result in the undesired event. Such analysis is entirely dependent upon a 
thorough knowledge of the system functions and equipment. Each of these 
contributing fault events is further analyzed to determine the logical relation- 
ships of system fault events which may cause them. In this manner, a fYreell 
of logical relationships among fault events is developed. The development is 
continued until all fault events on the tree are defined in terms of basic, identi- 
fiable faults which may be assigned known probability values. The connections 
between the events are depicted in the fault trees as a progression of events 
through logic gates. Two basic logic gates are used in constructing a fault 
tree: The AND and the OR gate. These and several variations of them which 
are occasionally used are described in the following paragraphs. 
AND Gate. The logical AND function is symbolized as follows: 
X 
This symbol is understood to represent the logic operation whereby a r'truel' 
output exists at X when inputs El  through E are simultaneously present in 
their "true" state. Otherwise X is in a "false1' stage. 
n 
i o  
PRIORITY AND Gate. The PRIORITY AND Gate performs the same 
function as an AND Gate with the additional stipulation that one event must 
precede the other. 
1 
De scription 
of 
Condition 
INHIBIT Gates. The INHIBIT Gates describe a causal relationship 
between one fault and another. The input event directly produces the output 
event if the indicated condition is satisfied. The conditional input defines a 
state of the system that permits the fault sequence to occur, and may be either 
normal to the system o r  the result of equipment failures. It is represented 
by an oval if it describes a specific failure mode, o r  a rectangle if it describes 
a condition which may exist for the life of the system. 
INHIBIT Gate. The INHIBIT Gate provides a means of applying 
conditional probabilities to the fault sequence. If the input event occurs and the 
condition is satisfied, a lltruelf output will be generated at X. 
X 
Input Event 
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RANDOM INHIBIT Gate. The RANDOM INHIBIT Gate is functionally 
the same as the INHIBIT Gate. However, in this case the conditional input is a 
variable. 
X 
Input Event 
Al l  of the above gates are basically AND Gates. The following two 
gates are OR Gates. 
OR Gate. 
This symbol represents the logic operation whereby a "truet1 output exists at 
X when any one o r  more of the inputs E i  and E are present in their "true" 
state. The output X is "falset7 only when all inputs E, through En are 'Yalse" 
simultaneously. N o  order requirements exist at OR Gates. 
n 
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EXCLUSIVE OR Gate. The EXCLUSIVE OR Gate performs the logical 
OR function but will not respond to the co-existence of two o r  more specified 
inputs. 
X 
Other Symbols. In addition to the gates, several other symbols are 
used in the construction of fault trees. 
The rectangle identifies an event, usually a malfunction, that results 
from the combination of fault  events through the logic gates. The rectangle is 
also used to describe conditional inputs to INHIBIT gates. In this use it 
indicates a condition that is presumed to exist for the life of the system. 
The circle describes a basic fault event that requires no further 
development. This category includes component failures whose frequency and 
mode of failure are derived through laboratory testing. 
0 
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The diamond describes a fault event that is considered basic in a given 
fault tree; however, the causes of the event have not been developed usually be- 
cause the event is of insufficient consequence. 
The oval is used to record the conditional input to an inhibit gate. It 
defines the state of the system that permits an event sequence to occur, and 
may be either normal to the system o r  be the result of equipment failures. 
The house indicates an event that is normally expected to occur. 
3 
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The triangles indicate transfer symbols. A line from the apex of the 
triangles indicates that data from another part of the tree is also to be input at 
this point. A line from the side of triangle denotes that this portion of the tree 
is also to be transferred to some other place in the tree. 
"he double diam-nnd is uged b the sLm-plification of the fault tree for 
numerical evaluation. The event described results from causes that have been 
developed but are not shown on a particular version of the fault tree. 
The term lfeventll represents that situation whereby an input to a gate 
or an output from a gate goes from an unfailed o r  "false" state to a state of 
failure o r  "trueT1 condition. This "event" represents a system failure, whether 
it be a basic hardware fault or a gate output resulting from input events. The 
"event1' will remain %xetl until the conditions for its existence are no longer 
satisfied; i. e. , either repair of a hardware failure is accomplished, thereby 
removing the failure from the system, or the input conditions required for a 
gate output are no longer satisfied due to some change in the system. 
Typical Fault Tree. A typical fault tree for a simple system is 
illustrated in Figure A-I. Fault trees representing more complex systems are 
much larger and more involved, but the relationships are  the same. The num- 
bers and letters on the tree are only to facilitate discussion and do not represent 
actual designations. 
by the letters A through K. The logical relationships among the events are 
represented by AND and OR gates and are given number designations i through 
The basic fault events are represented by circles and are  designated 
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7. The output events a re  represented by rectangles and are designated by Xi 
through X,. 
The overall effect of this representation is to present a working model 
of the inter-relationships of basic system failure events as they contribute to a 
major system failure. 
Step 4 - Collect Quantitative Data 
After  having constructed the fault tree in sufficient depth such that the 
inputs are specified in terms of component failure, the next step is to deter- 
mine the probability of failure of each of the components. This type of data is 
available from such sources as the Failure Rate Data Program o r  the Relia- 
bility Group within one's organization. 
Step 5 - Symbolize the Fault Tree Algebraically 
Examining the sample tree in Figure A-1, it is seen that the event Qi 
(represented by a true output from gate i) is equivalent to the "true" state of 
both events X2 and X3. In similar fashion X2 is equivalent to the true state of 
either event A or event X4 o r  both. The logical AND is represented by the 
symbol ( ) and the logical OR by the symbol (+) . Each gate can then be 
represented as follows: 
The total tree can then be represented by a single equation (by simple 
substitution) as follows: 
= ( A + B *  C D} ( [ J +  (X7+I)] . K} 
= ( A + B C D } * ( [ J + ( E *  F . G .  H ) + I I K }  
= [A+BDCl [ K ( I + J + E F G H ) ] .  
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Figure A - i .  Typical Fault Tree 
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This equation is a Boolean representation of the fault tree. It is to be noted 
that the gates in the tree establish the relationships of the events in the end 
expression and that the output of the tree is expressed in terms of the basic 
input events. 
Another sample tree, Figure A-2 shows how interfunctional relati- 
ships are handled. For example, failure event W has an effect on gates 6, 8, 
9, and 10 or ultimately gates 2, 3, 4, and 5; thus it can be seen that event W 
and any one of four other events provide a straight path to Q. The equation 
which represents the tree (using the substitution technique described above) is: 
Q i = ( C + D )  ( V + W + X Y Z )  + B ( V + W + X ) + A ( V + W + Z )  + 
+ E ( W  + Y). 
The probabilities of failure can now be utilized in the equation for the fault 
tree. By using normal relationships for the combination of probabilities and 
converting the equation from a Boolean expression to a normal algebraic 
expression, the equation will yield the probability of occurrence of each of the 
major branches to that probability. If the probability of occurrence of the 
undesired event is determined to be too high, the branch which is the major 
contributor can be identified and efforts to increase the safety can be applied 
to the most promising branch. 
Step 6 - Solve the  Algebraic Equations to Determine the 
Level of Safety 
In the simplest of fault trees the solution of the equation consists of 
simply applying Boolean techniques to the equation originally derived from the 
fault tree to reduce the equation to the simplest possible form. The proba- 
bilities of the failures are then substituted into the equation and the equation is 
algebraically solved to yield the overall probability of the undesired event. Few 
trees are small and simple enough to solve in this manner and the solution is 
usually obtained by computer. The computer procedure is the same as the 
manual method except that the computer is given the output of each gate as a 
function of the gate inputs and the computer not only develops the equation but 
removes the redundancies and calculates the probabilities. 
The computer method offers many other advantages in cases where 
simulation is required o r  where "Repairf1 is considered. The simulation is 
conducted by generating random life length and repair times, according to the 
18 
I I 1 > I 
Q2 Q, Q C  Qs 
Figure A-2. Interfunctional Relationships 
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probability distribution given for each input. This is done by pseudo-random 
number generations on the computer. These random numbers provide data for 
a computer analog of the fault-tree. At  the occurrence of a failure of any input 
the fault tree logic stored in the machine is checked to see if the undesired or  
the time period of interest, T, has elapsed. A t  this time, all of the inputs are 
recycles to an llupff state and a new trial begins. After  a predetermined num- 
ber of trials have been considered, an estimate is computed for the probability 
of the undesired event occurring within that time period from the formula: 
where n = number of times the undesired event has occurred out of N trials. 
It can be seen that after all of the above steps have been accomplished, 
a quantitative measure of the safety of the system can be established; the 
contribution of each event to the "unsafe" condition can be determined; and the 
safety impact of any change to that system can be assessed. Therefore the 
"promise" of a suggested change toward increasing the overall safety of the 
system can be assessed. 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Huntsville, Alabama, June 28, 1967 
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